Erdoğan’ın en yakınındaki danışmanlarından Ankara Milletvekili Yalçın Akdoğan, “Yeni süreçte terörle mücadele ve demokratikleşme, birbirine paralel devam edecek.” diyor.
Ankara, olağanüstü bir haftayı daha geride bıraktı. Birbiri ardına yapılan terör saldırıları bardağı taşırdı. Çarşamba günü geç saatlerde Türk uçakları uzun bir aradan sonra sınırın hemen ötesindeki PKK kamplarını bombaladı. Aslında perşembenin gelişi çarşambadan belliydi. Başbakan Erdoğan, ramazan sonrası için tarih vermiş, teröre karşı etkin önlemler alınacağını söylemişti. Ağustos şûrası sancılı geçse de yeni komuta kademesinin ilk işi, ellerinde dosyalarla Başbakanlık konutunda terör zirvesi yapmak olmuştu. Hakkâri Çukurca’dan gelen 9 şehit haberi, bıçağın kemiğe dayandığı son nokta oldu ve operasyonlar için düğmeye basıldı. Peki, bundan sonra ne olacak? Hükümetin yeni terörle mücadele konseptinde neler var? Demokratikleşme sekteye uğrar mı? Başbakan Erdoğan’ın en yakınındaki danışmanlarından Ankara Milletvekili Yalçın Akdoğan’a sorduk.
-Meclis Başkanı Cemil Çiçek’in yeni anayasaya destek vermeleri için muhalefet liderleri ile görüşüp uzlaştığı gün Çukurca’dan şehit haberleri geldi? Eylemler demokratikleşmeyi mi hedef alıyor?
Bugüne kadar Türkiye ne zaman ayakları üzerine doğrulsa, ne zaman demokratik adımlar atmaya kalksa birileri bu süreçleri sabote etmeye çalıştı. Referandum sürecinde gördük, seçim süreçlerinde yaşadık. O zaman şunu sormak gerekiyor: Hangi amaca hizmet ediyorlar?
-Hangi amaca?
Seçimden çıkılmış, yeni bir anayasa yapmak için herkes ümitlenmiş, kronik sorunların çözümü için imkân doğmuş, tarihî fırsat önümüze konmuşken birileri sabote etmenin derdinde. Bu, kirli bir oyun. Terör örgütünün süreci sabote etmesine müsamaha gösterilemez. Ayrıca PKK’nın bölgede vatandaşlar üzerinde baskı ve şantajla nüfuz oluşturmasına da izin veremeyiz. Şu anda PKK bölgede haraç topluyor, iş makinelerini yakıyor, iş yeri kapattırıyor. Peki, bu insanlar kim? Hepsi Kürt. Bölgedeki Kürt vatandaşlarımızın üzerinde PKK’nın ciddi bir baskı oluşturup bunun üzerinden bir siyasi alan açma çabası var. Bunu kırmak durumundayız. Vatandaşlarımızı PKK’nın esareti altına sokamayız. Açılımın sürmesi, demokratikleşme sürecinin devamı açısından terör örgütünün etkisinin kırılması büyük önem taşıyor.
-Güvenlik politikalarının öne çıkması, demokratikleşmeyi olumsuz etkiler mi?
Terörle mücadele varsa demokratikleşme yok, demokratikleşme varsa terörle mücadele yok anlayışı yanlıştır. Demokratik açılımın iki ayağı var. Bir, demokratikleşme; iki, terörün son bulması. Demokratikleşme devam edecek, hak ve özgürlüklerin geliştirilmesi için çalışacağız. Aynı zamanda daha etkin bir şekilde terörle mücadele de sürdürülecek.
-Ancak 90’lı yıllara dönme endişesi var.
Türkiye, 90’lı yıllara dönemez ve dönmeyecektir. 90’lı yıllarda kirli bir savaş vardı. Bu savaş üzerinden toplum ve hükümet baskı altına alınmış, siyaset kurumu etkisizleşmişti. Birtakım hukuksuzluklar yaşanıyordu. Orada terörle mücadele edilirken PKK ve vatandaş birbirinden ayırt edilmemişti. Hukuk dışına çıkılarak, yanlışlar yaparak, vatandaşa PKK’lı muamelesi yapılarak verilen bu mücadele PKK’ya kayıp verdirmedi, aksine daha çok halk desteği bulmasına sebep oldu. Bölgede olağan dışı şartlar ortaya çıktı. Bugün demokrasiden taviz verilemez.
-Bu dengeyi nasıl koruyacaksınız?
Hukuk dışına çıkmadan vatandaşı değil, PKK’yı hedef alan bir mücadeleden bahsediyoruz. O günkü anlayış inkâr ve imhaydı. Bu anlayış çoktan geride kaldı ve bir daha bu anlayışa dönülemez. Bugün inkâr ve imha değil, demokrasi ve mücadele dönemi var. Demokrasi içinde her şey gerçekleşiyor. Kürtlerin varlığı tanındı. Hak ve özgürlükler noktasında meseleye bakılarak bir paradigma değişikliğine gidildi. İnkârcı, dışlayıcı anlayış yerine hak ve özgürlükleri kabullenen daha şefkatli bir anlayış geldi. Bu paradigma değişimi zaten Kürt meselesinin en önemli ayağının, siyasi ayağının ortadan kalkmasına sebep oldu.
-Nasıl?
Kürt meselesi dediğimizde bir; ilgisizlik, geri kalmışlık, geri bırakılmışlık durumu vardı. İki; ayrımcı, dışlayıcı bir anlayış vardı. Bu ikisi problemdi. Paradigma değişti ama ortada şimdi başka bir sorun var: Ayrılıkçı, etnik Kürt milliyetçiliği temelinde silahı, terörü kullanan bir anlayış...
-Paradigma değişikliğinin sonuçlarını nasıl göreceğiz?
Eskiden sivil irade sürecin çok dışındaydı. Tribünden izliyordu olayları. Mesele askere havale edilmişti. Yeni süreçte asker-sivil ilişkilerinin normalleştiğini görüyoruz. Siyasi irade muktedir hâle geliyor. Birçok alanda daha etkili artık. Bunların içinde terörle mücadele de var. Terörle mücadelenin yönlendirilmesi, kontrolü sivil iradenin denetiminde olacak.
-Somut hangi adımlar atılacak?
Terörle mücadele konseptini hazırlayıp hayata geçirecek olan siyasi iktidardır, bunu uygulayacak olan da elbette güvenlik güçleri olacaktır. Yeni teknolojilerle, yeni yöntemlerle terörle daha etkin mücadele edilecek. Valilerin sürecin içinde olması, karar noktasında gecikmeleri engelleyecek. Daha hızlı hareket etmek, daha profesyonel birliklerle bu işi yapmak, teknolojiyi daha fazla kullanılmak ve uluslararası ilişkileri daha etkin hâle getirmekle daha iyi bir netice alınacaktır.
-Eylemler atılacak adımları engeller mi?
Tersine, terör tırmanır, sorun daha da büyürse yeni düzenlemelere gidilmesi hızlanacaktır.
-Terör eylemleri Kürt sorununun çözümünü nasıl etkiler?
Saldırılar, örgütü hedefine götürmeye dönük değil, taktik saldırılar. Hükümeti köşeye sıkıştırmak istiyorlar. Ortada bir Kürt sorunu var ama PKK ve BDP’nin tanımladığı Kürt sorunu, kendi hedef ve amaçlarını ifade ediyor. Bundan dolayı çözüm dendiğinde kastettikleri de kendi amaçları oluyor. Kürt sorununu çözdüğünüzde siz onların sorununu çözmüş olmuyorsunuz. Sosyal politikalar yapın, devletin şefkat elini götürün, bunlar Kürt sorunu çözülmüştür demiyorlar. Çünkü çözüm tanımlamaları bizimkinden farklı.
-Çözümden ne anlıyorlar?
Abdullah Öcalan’ın kurtarılması, PKK’nın meşrulaştırılması, özerklik… Siz demokratik bir ülkede vatandaşların özgürlüklerini geliştirmeye çalışıyorsunuz, herkes insanca yaşasın, ana dilini konuşsun diyorsunuz ve bu yönde adımlar atıyorsunuz; ancak BDP bunu yetersiz görüyor. Onlar amaç ve hedeflerine ulaşmak için demokratikleşmeyi yeterli bir yöntem olarak görmüyorlar.
-Neden?
Çünkü demokrasi içinde bu hedeflerine ulaşamazlar. Toplum kabul edemez. Böyle olduğu için de dayatmaya gidiyorlar. Terör o zaman devreye giriyor. Biz şunu reddetmiyoruz. BDP demokratik bir mücadele vermelidir, dışlanmamalıdır. Ama örgütün hedeflerini dayatmaya kalkarsan buna demokrasilerde kimse eyvallah demez. BDP de biliyor ki o politikasını demokrasi içinde gerçekleştiremez. Adam çıkıyor ‘Ben demokratik özerklik ilan ettim’ diyor. Bu tür dayatmalarla hükümeti bir yere getirmeye çalışıyorlar.
-KCK operasyonları hep eleştirildi. Açılıma darbe olarak değerlendirenler oldu? Buna katılıyor musunuz?
Açılım var diye siz bir hukuksuzluğa göz yumamazsınız. Terör örgütü şehirlerde birtakım yapılanmalar kurup bölge halkı üzerinde tehdit oluşturuyor, kendi belediye başkanlarını örgüt komiserleri sorguya çekebiliyorsa buna tahammül edilemez. Buna elbette operasyon yapacaktır. Legal ve illegal birbirine karıştırılamaz. KCK operasyonları doğru ve gereklidir. Uygulamada bazı yanlışlık olabilir ancak özü itibari ile yasa dışı yapılara hukuk devletinde göz yumulamaz.
-Meclis açıldığında BDP ile ilişki kuracak mısınız? Onlardan ne bekliyorsunuz?
BDP sahici bir aktör olmalı, demokrasiyi bütün kurumları ve kuralları ile kabullenmeli. Sorunun değil, çözümün bir parçası olmalı. Toplumu kışkırtan tavır ve davranışlardan kaçınarak sorunun çözümüne destek vermeli. PKK’nın terör eylemleri süreci ne kadar zora sokuyorsa, BDP’lilerinki de o kadar toplumu geriyor. Bir çözümden bahsediyorsak bu bütün toplumun kabul edeceği bir çözüm olacaktır. Toplumsal algıyı hesaba katmalıyız. Kendi kitlelerini hesaba katarak konuşurlarsa süreçleri zora sokmuş olurlar. PKK kanlı saldırılar gerçekleştirdiğinde ortaya koydukları tavırlar önemli. İnsanların yaşam hakkı ortadan kaldırılırken tek kelime laf etmiyorsun, o zaman ben senin samimiyetine nasıl inanacağım?
-Anayasa çalışmalarından sonuç alabilecek misiniz?
AK Parti komisyon kurdu, dersini çalışıyor, hazırlıklarını yapıyor. Diğer partilerin ne diyeceği de önemli. Ancak biz samimi olarak çalışmaları devam ettireceğiz.
22.08.2011, AKSİYON, İDRİS GÜRSOY
25 Ağustos 2011 Perşembe
20 Ağustos 2011 Cumartesi
Guardianship cannot be eliminated without destroying coup tradition
İdris Gürsoy, Ankara
She was just 10 years old, living in the presidential palace, when she woke up to the sound of the tanks.
She stepped out of her room with fear, and it would only be shortly after that she would understand what was going on. A group of military officers had taken over the administration by carrying out a coup on May 27, 1960. This was the end of the road for her grandfather, Celal Bayar, and prime minister at the time, Adnan Menderes. Emine Gursoy Naskali, along with her family, was taken to Çeşme where she would remain in custody, whilst Bayar and Menderes as well as their colleagues were arrested and put on trial, which would eventually take them to an execution court. The Yassıada trials were held to convict the Democrat Party (DP)-led government members; the democratically elected government had been overthrown and the military had introduced a guardianship regime.
Bayar had warned the government about a coup plot by nine military officers in 1957. However, the DP did not take the warning seriously; eight out of the nine suspects were released and reinstated in their positions. The juntas went underground. Bayar’s concerns were confirmed three years later on May 27, 1960.
We talked with Professor Naskali about the tradition of coups that began with the May 27 coup. Naskali gave interesting details on the Yassıada trials and explained why businessman Vehbi Koç had not agreed to be a witness despite requests by DP members. Her most important message, however, suggested that the guardianship regime is not over yet despite growing efforts to address the coup issue. Naskali, who gave the minutes of the Yassıada trials to researchers, deserves greater attention because of her extensive firsthand experience of the near past of Turkey, her expertise on historical documents from the 1960 period and what she learned from talking with the leading actors of the time.
What would you say about the involvement of the military officers in the Yassıada trials, in the coups and the prosecution of the military for similar charges today?
The junta carried out the coup and during the period between August 1960 and February 1961; 235 generals and 5,000 high-ranking officers who would not lend support to the coup were expelled from the army. Is this our glorious army or the junta? Those who represented the military after the coup are the same as the post-coup structure that the coup-makers desired. I cannot talk about a normal and regular army after the coup in 1960. In the aftermath of the coup, the military was surrendered to the coup makers.
Are the traces of May 27 still evident in the army?
Some army members see the military as a command party superior to regular political parties. The 1961 Constitution involved the military in politics. It honored the 1960 coup and promoted the idea that coups are a part of the army’s regular job. The military has not gotten rid of the May 27 mentality. It does not say that May 27 was a criminal act, but it makes statements in regards to any issue that does not actually concern it. Chiefs of General Staff make public statements on a variety of issues, including economy and language. They visit storeowners. This is pretty unusual; it seems that the army is unable to interpret the world and Turkey.
How do you perceive the retirements of Işık Koşaner and three top military commanders right before the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) meeting?
The recent resignations, the change in the Supreme Military Council, the ongoing investigation into the coup plots and plans to foment chaos as well as the decisions not to promote the military officers under detention are positive and constructive developments.
Your grandfather Bayar warned the DP government over a likely coup attempt. How would he react to the Ergenekon case now?
He would extend full support for the investigation and ask the authorities to exhibit determination in addressing this issue.
The request by Chief of General Staff Işık Koşaner and the top military commanders for early retirement did not result in a crisis. Is the era of coups over?
I would not say there is a chance for a coup, but I still have some doubts. The laws are important, but they alone do not resolve the problems. How the military officers are trained in the army is an important issue. They are indoctrinated there that they are the true owners of this country. The officers are raised by this mindset. This needs to be changed. It is a matter of mentality, not a matter of law. The civilians should also see this that way.
What should the civilian administration do about this matter?
They should dominate the military and should not make concessions. They should also get rid of the coup mentality from the Constitution and the laws. All these are fine, but the chance for a coup in Turkey is still not remote in Turkey.
Why is it so difficult to eliminate the guardianship?
They have governed the country with a single-party regime; guardianship means that they come in between individuals and the institutions. It is not all about whether an institution exists or not. Guardianship persists if the people with this mindset are still in that institution.
How is that?
The judges and prosecutors at Yassıada as well as the interrogators were appointed to the top positions in the justice system after the coup. They have remained in judicial mechanism their whole lives; naturally, they have left indelible marks on the judicial mechanism by picking the members of the judiciary that would replace them. The judicial bureaucracy has been shaped by people who served the coup attempts. The chief judge, Salim Başol, who said, “The power that locked you up here asked for this judgment,” was appointed as a member of the Constitutional Court created by the ’61 Constitution. The chief prosecutor, Altay Egesel, was appointed as a member of the Supreme Court of Appeals. There are a number of other similar cases. The same is in the military. The low ranking military officers from that era have been involved in all coup attempts since.
How?
May 27 was good training for coups; Ergenekon suspect Hurşit Tolon filed a lawsuit against me, arguing that I was influencing the trial process because I had made a statement. I said this: Tolon said he was a cadet during the coup. But he moved to the War Academy right after the coup. Where are the two years in between? In Ankara, the War Academy. What does the War Academy represent? The coup; the commander of the War Academy was executed in 1962. Why? Because he attempted to stage a coup against [İsmet] İnönü; I am drawing attention to the atmosphere within the War Academy.
Do the military and the judiciary have coup supporters?
It should be noted that there have always been coup attempts; the army has such a tradition. It strongly affects the military. Huge progress has been made with the referendum. The provisions on military guardianship have been amended. But not everything has been fixed. The coup tradition should be addressed properly. Defending the coup supporters in some courts goes to show that this mentality is still around in the military.
What did you feel when reading the minutes of the Yassıada trials?
This hurt me. I was hurt really badly reading the minutes; I was deeply hurt by the fact that these people, who had served extensively for the people and the nation, had been tortured. There were horrible things back then. Why did you kill the finance minister? Well, you executed the foreign minister because he was tough on the military. What was the fault of [Hasan] Polatkan? It is not possible to understand it.
How were the trials held? What was the most interesting thing in the minutes?
The fate of the trials in Yassıada, İmralı and Kayseri were all decided before they began. They had already made up their minds who they would execute and who they would send to jail. They did not insert any information that would help the DP; the lawyers tried to call İnönü, but the prosecutor and judges did not accept the motion, arguing that he was such a noble man that he could not be called to the court for testimony. However, his name appeared in all the cases. Businessman Vehbi Koç was also not summoned as witness. One of the accusations against the DP was that they contributed to the increase in the wealth of their supporters. For this reason, the DP lawyers called Koç as witness. He did not show up, saying he had a business meeting in Italy.
Why was Koç asked to give testimony in court?
The indictment stated that the DP government put pressure on the people and that the DP allegedly threatened to grant loans for its supporters alone. However, Vehbi Koç from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) received the greatest amount of loans during DP rule. He was asked to confirm this fact in court. Koç was a registered member in the CHP, but he later resigned. Again, they argued that the DP had forced him to do this. But the reason for his resignation was not that.
What was it?
Vehbi Koç relied on imports. Hasan Polatkan sent him a message saying that he had not implemented any project that would improve industrial production. Koç became concerned about this because what he really needed to make industrial investments. Back then, he was about to decide to become involved in the automotive industry. But it was difficult for him to do this with his CHP identity. In order to avoid this disadvantage, he stripped off his political identity by resigning. But he has always been close to the CHP.
The DP was also accused of introducing a dictatorial regime in the country?
The same happens now as well. A DP deputy said in his defense, “A government that would introduce a dictatorial regime requires armed forces.” It is certain that the military was not backing up the DP. The police was half the size of the Paris police department back then. The total number of police staff was insufficient to create a dictatorial regime in the country. A review of the other dictatorial regimes shows that they have strong party organizations, youth assemblies and local branches relying on violence. The DP did not have such organizations. The youth organization was assembled as an attempt to imitate the CHP. Otherwise, the government members would not have been summoned and taken to Yassıada within half an hour.
Why do some circles and the CHP still defend the Ergenekon-like groups facing charges over coup attempts?
They are pleased with these illegal groups. They want the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to be overthrown and some of its members to be executed.
The Yassıada decisions are still out there; what should be done about it?
May 27 has not yet been confirmed as a criminal act. Most people condemn the coup. The judicial decisions taken during this period should be declared invalid. Their crimes should be confirmed. But how would this happen? The families of the victims should file a petition or motion for the annulment of the decisions of the Yassıada courts. Such a process may work. A special court was set up, but this is a coup court. Most of the staff were military judges and prosecutors. There is no such court anymore. A legal process may be initiated to annul the decisions of a nonexistent court. This should be given a thought.
Işık Koşaner was also in the drill in Yassıada. The military officers who carried out the May 27 coup were well trained. These officers were appointed to the key posts in the military councils, where the civilians had no voice. These officers played extensive roles in the Sept. 12, Feb. 28 processes, the Ergenekon and Balyoz coup attempts. Some commanders currently facing trial in the Ergenekon case assumed roles in the processes, where the DP members were persecuted and tortured during the coup in 1960. İsmail Hakkı Karadayı attended the rally held by War Academy cadets 60 years ago. İlker Başbuğ was in the Land Forces War Academy, which played a key role in the coup attempt on Feb. 22, 1962.
Before the start of the Yassıada trials, in June 1960, an announcement was made at the Kuleli Military School, calling on the second graders to appear in official uniforms in the morning gathering and noting that there would be a military drill in Yassıada. The second graders were called to the drill. The cadets called to the drill included Işık Koşaner and Veli Küçük. I heard this incident from Professor Mustafa Çetin Varlık and Professor Metin Karaörs. They were also second graders in Kuleli. They walked out of the school building, boarded a boat in Çengelköy and their IDs were checked at a barracks used as a liaison office in Dolmabahçe; they then boarded another boat. Nobody talked on the boat. When the boat arrived in Yassıada, they got off the boat and headed to the courtroom. The students took this drill as if they would attend the hearings in the next court session. The details of the drill were all planned, including the distance to be travelled and the time to be spent. But the most shocking exercise was done by the Yassıada judges and prosecutors. When the students took their seats, the Yassıada judges and prosecutors appeared in the courtroom, talking to the officers and making the final touches to the fictional hearing.
What did Bayar say about the junta within the army?
“When the incident with the nine officers was exposed in the army, Adnan Menderes got quite upset as prime minister because he thought the army was not involved in political affairs. He believed that Atatürk’s army would not get involved in daily political business and take action against a government elected by popular vote. For Menderes, the army was part of the nation outside of the political domain. It should be under the command of the nation. The prime minister held these views because of his understanding of Atatürk’s constitution and the state ideal. He took care of the incident. But he was so confident that the army would not be involved in politics that he did not go into detail. I found the incident with the nine officers pretty serious. I warned the prime minister and the Cabinet about this issue. The setup included Cemal Yıldırım, who shared his idea of organizing a coup in 1946. Menderes and I had Cemal Yıldırım in Selahattin Güvendiren’s home in İstanbul where we gave him extensive advice. Apparently, the ambitious officer was not affected by our advice and recommendations and sought additional ventures out of his ambition. The prime minister recalled all this, and he was aware of it. Despite this, he did not initiate a thorough investigation. I likened Menderes to a sad father who did not want to expose the criminal acts of his son. The officers were acquitted; the informant officer was convicted. The prime minister found the appointment of a new defense minister suitable and sufficient to address the whole case…”
She was just 10 years old, living in the presidential palace, when she woke up to the sound of the tanks.
She stepped out of her room with fear, and it would only be shortly after that she would understand what was going on. A group of military officers had taken over the administration by carrying out a coup on May 27, 1960. This was the end of the road for her grandfather, Celal Bayar, and prime minister at the time, Adnan Menderes. Emine Gursoy Naskali, along with her family, was taken to Çeşme where she would remain in custody, whilst Bayar and Menderes as well as their colleagues were arrested and put on trial, which would eventually take them to an execution court. The Yassıada trials were held to convict the Democrat Party (DP)-led government members; the democratically elected government had been overthrown and the military had introduced a guardianship regime.
Bayar had warned the government about a coup plot by nine military officers in 1957. However, the DP did not take the warning seriously; eight out of the nine suspects were released and reinstated in their positions. The juntas went underground. Bayar’s concerns were confirmed three years later on May 27, 1960.
We talked with Professor Naskali about the tradition of coups that began with the May 27 coup. Naskali gave interesting details on the Yassıada trials and explained why businessman Vehbi Koç had not agreed to be a witness despite requests by DP members. Her most important message, however, suggested that the guardianship regime is not over yet despite growing efforts to address the coup issue. Naskali, who gave the minutes of the Yassıada trials to researchers, deserves greater attention because of her extensive firsthand experience of the near past of Turkey, her expertise on historical documents from the 1960 period and what she learned from talking with the leading actors of the time.
What would you say about the involvement of the military officers in the Yassıada trials, in the coups and the prosecution of the military for similar charges today?
The junta carried out the coup and during the period between August 1960 and February 1961; 235 generals and 5,000 high-ranking officers who would not lend support to the coup were expelled from the army. Is this our glorious army or the junta? Those who represented the military after the coup are the same as the post-coup structure that the coup-makers desired. I cannot talk about a normal and regular army after the coup in 1960. In the aftermath of the coup, the military was surrendered to the coup makers.
Are the traces of May 27 still evident in the army?
Some army members see the military as a command party superior to regular political parties. The 1961 Constitution involved the military in politics. It honored the 1960 coup and promoted the idea that coups are a part of the army’s regular job. The military has not gotten rid of the May 27 mentality. It does not say that May 27 was a criminal act, but it makes statements in regards to any issue that does not actually concern it. Chiefs of General Staff make public statements on a variety of issues, including economy and language. They visit storeowners. This is pretty unusual; it seems that the army is unable to interpret the world and Turkey.
How do you perceive the retirements of Işık Koşaner and three top military commanders right before the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) meeting?
The recent resignations, the change in the Supreme Military Council, the ongoing investigation into the coup plots and plans to foment chaos as well as the decisions not to promote the military officers under detention are positive and constructive developments.
Your grandfather Bayar warned the DP government over a likely coup attempt. How would he react to the Ergenekon case now?
He would extend full support for the investigation and ask the authorities to exhibit determination in addressing this issue.
The request by Chief of General Staff Işık Koşaner and the top military commanders for early retirement did not result in a crisis. Is the era of coups over?
I would not say there is a chance for a coup, but I still have some doubts. The laws are important, but they alone do not resolve the problems. How the military officers are trained in the army is an important issue. They are indoctrinated there that they are the true owners of this country. The officers are raised by this mindset. This needs to be changed. It is a matter of mentality, not a matter of law. The civilians should also see this that way.
What should the civilian administration do about this matter?
They should dominate the military and should not make concessions. They should also get rid of the coup mentality from the Constitution and the laws. All these are fine, but the chance for a coup in Turkey is still not remote in Turkey.
Why is it so difficult to eliminate the guardianship?
They have governed the country with a single-party regime; guardianship means that they come in between individuals and the institutions. It is not all about whether an institution exists or not. Guardianship persists if the people with this mindset are still in that institution.
How is that?
The judges and prosecutors at Yassıada as well as the interrogators were appointed to the top positions in the justice system after the coup. They have remained in judicial mechanism their whole lives; naturally, they have left indelible marks on the judicial mechanism by picking the members of the judiciary that would replace them. The judicial bureaucracy has been shaped by people who served the coup attempts. The chief judge, Salim Başol, who said, “The power that locked you up here asked for this judgment,” was appointed as a member of the Constitutional Court created by the ’61 Constitution. The chief prosecutor, Altay Egesel, was appointed as a member of the Supreme Court of Appeals. There are a number of other similar cases. The same is in the military. The low ranking military officers from that era have been involved in all coup attempts since.
How?
May 27 was good training for coups; Ergenekon suspect Hurşit Tolon filed a lawsuit against me, arguing that I was influencing the trial process because I had made a statement. I said this: Tolon said he was a cadet during the coup. But he moved to the War Academy right after the coup. Where are the two years in between? In Ankara, the War Academy. What does the War Academy represent? The coup; the commander of the War Academy was executed in 1962. Why? Because he attempted to stage a coup against [İsmet] İnönü; I am drawing attention to the atmosphere within the War Academy.
Do the military and the judiciary have coup supporters?
It should be noted that there have always been coup attempts; the army has such a tradition. It strongly affects the military. Huge progress has been made with the referendum. The provisions on military guardianship have been amended. But not everything has been fixed. The coup tradition should be addressed properly. Defending the coup supporters in some courts goes to show that this mentality is still around in the military.
What did you feel when reading the minutes of the Yassıada trials?
This hurt me. I was hurt really badly reading the minutes; I was deeply hurt by the fact that these people, who had served extensively for the people and the nation, had been tortured. There were horrible things back then. Why did you kill the finance minister? Well, you executed the foreign minister because he was tough on the military. What was the fault of [Hasan] Polatkan? It is not possible to understand it.
How were the trials held? What was the most interesting thing in the minutes?
The fate of the trials in Yassıada, İmralı and Kayseri were all decided before they began. They had already made up their minds who they would execute and who they would send to jail. They did not insert any information that would help the DP; the lawyers tried to call İnönü, but the prosecutor and judges did not accept the motion, arguing that he was such a noble man that he could not be called to the court for testimony. However, his name appeared in all the cases. Businessman Vehbi Koç was also not summoned as witness. One of the accusations against the DP was that they contributed to the increase in the wealth of their supporters. For this reason, the DP lawyers called Koç as witness. He did not show up, saying he had a business meeting in Italy.
Why was Koç asked to give testimony in court?
The indictment stated that the DP government put pressure on the people and that the DP allegedly threatened to grant loans for its supporters alone. However, Vehbi Koç from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) received the greatest amount of loans during DP rule. He was asked to confirm this fact in court. Koç was a registered member in the CHP, but he later resigned. Again, they argued that the DP had forced him to do this. But the reason for his resignation was not that.
What was it?
Vehbi Koç relied on imports. Hasan Polatkan sent him a message saying that he had not implemented any project that would improve industrial production. Koç became concerned about this because what he really needed to make industrial investments. Back then, he was about to decide to become involved in the automotive industry. But it was difficult for him to do this with his CHP identity. In order to avoid this disadvantage, he stripped off his political identity by resigning. But he has always been close to the CHP.
The DP was also accused of introducing a dictatorial regime in the country?
The same happens now as well. A DP deputy said in his defense, “A government that would introduce a dictatorial regime requires armed forces.” It is certain that the military was not backing up the DP. The police was half the size of the Paris police department back then. The total number of police staff was insufficient to create a dictatorial regime in the country. A review of the other dictatorial regimes shows that they have strong party organizations, youth assemblies and local branches relying on violence. The DP did not have such organizations. The youth organization was assembled as an attempt to imitate the CHP. Otherwise, the government members would not have been summoned and taken to Yassıada within half an hour.
Why do some circles and the CHP still defend the Ergenekon-like groups facing charges over coup attempts?
They are pleased with these illegal groups. They want the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to be overthrown and some of its members to be executed.
The Yassıada decisions are still out there; what should be done about it?
May 27 has not yet been confirmed as a criminal act. Most people condemn the coup. The judicial decisions taken during this period should be declared invalid. Their crimes should be confirmed. But how would this happen? The families of the victims should file a petition or motion for the annulment of the decisions of the Yassıada courts. Such a process may work. A special court was set up, but this is a coup court. Most of the staff were military judges and prosecutors. There is no such court anymore. A legal process may be initiated to annul the decisions of a nonexistent court. This should be given a thought.
Işık Koşaner was also in the drill in Yassıada. The military officers who carried out the May 27 coup were well trained. These officers were appointed to the key posts in the military councils, where the civilians had no voice. These officers played extensive roles in the Sept. 12, Feb. 28 processes, the Ergenekon and Balyoz coup attempts. Some commanders currently facing trial in the Ergenekon case assumed roles in the processes, where the DP members were persecuted and tortured during the coup in 1960. İsmail Hakkı Karadayı attended the rally held by War Academy cadets 60 years ago. İlker Başbuğ was in the Land Forces War Academy, which played a key role in the coup attempt on Feb. 22, 1962.
Before the start of the Yassıada trials, in June 1960, an announcement was made at the Kuleli Military School, calling on the second graders to appear in official uniforms in the morning gathering and noting that there would be a military drill in Yassıada. The second graders were called to the drill. The cadets called to the drill included Işık Koşaner and Veli Küçük. I heard this incident from Professor Mustafa Çetin Varlık and Professor Metin Karaörs. They were also second graders in Kuleli. They walked out of the school building, boarded a boat in Çengelköy and their IDs were checked at a barracks used as a liaison office in Dolmabahçe; they then boarded another boat. Nobody talked on the boat. When the boat arrived in Yassıada, they got off the boat and headed to the courtroom. The students took this drill as if they would attend the hearings in the next court session. The details of the drill were all planned, including the distance to be travelled and the time to be spent. But the most shocking exercise was done by the Yassıada judges and prosecutors. When the students took their seats, the Yassıada judges and prosecutors appeared in the courtroom, talking to the officers and making the final touches to the fictional hearing.
What did Bayar say about the junta within the army?
“When the incident with the nine officers was exposed in the army, Adnan Menderes got quite upset as prime minister because he thought the army was not involved in political affairs. He believed that Atatürk’s army would not get involved in daily political business and take action against a government elected by popular vote. For Menderes, the army was part of the nation outside of the political domain. It should be under the command of the nation. The prime minister held these views because of his understanding of Atatürk’s constitution and the state ideal. He took care of the incident. But he was so confident that the army would not be involved in politics that he did not go into detail. I found the incident with the nine officers pretty serious. I warned the prime minister and the Cabinet about this issue. The setup included Cemal Yıldırım, who shared his idea of organizing a coup in 1946. Menderes and I had Cemal Yıldırım in Selahattin Güvendiren’s home in İstanbul where we gave him extensive advice. Apparently, the ambitious officer was not affected by our advice and recommendations and sought additional ventures out of his ambition. The prime minister recalled all this, and he was aware of it. Despite this, he did not initiate a thorough investigation. I likened Menderes to a sad father who did not want to expose the criminal acts of his son. The officers were acquitted; the informant officer was convicted. The prime minister found the appointment of a new defense minister suitable and sufficient to address the whole case…”
TURGUT ÖZAL NEDEN ACELE İSTANBUL'A GİTMİŞTİ?
2011 Yüksek Askerî Şûra’sı, akıllara Özal’ın 1987’deki ‘Necdetler Operasyonu’nu getirdi. Eski bakanlardan Mehmet Keçeciler, o günleri anlatırken “Bir darbe ihtimaline karşı Özal’ı alelacele İstanbul’a gönderdik.” diyor
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10 Ağustos 2011 Çarşamba
Darbe damarı kurutulmadan vesayet bitirilemez
İDRİS GÜRSOY
Aksiyon Dergisi Sayı: 870 / Tarih : 08-08-2011
27 Mayıs’ta tankların gürültüsü ile uyandığında 10 yaşında olan 3. Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Bayar’ın torunu Prof. Emine Gürsoy Naskali, vesayet rejiminin henüz bitmediğine dair tespitlerde bulunuyor: ‘Bu memleketin hakimi benim’ zihniyetiyle yetişiyor subaylar hâlâ. Bunun değişmesi lazım.
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